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We focus on credal nets, which are graphical models that generalise Bayesian nets to im-
precise probability. We replace the notion of strong independence commonly used in credal
nets with the weaker notion of epistemic irrelevance, which is arguably more suited for a
behavioural theory of probability. Focusing on directed trees, we show how to combine the
given local uncertainty models in the nodes of the graph into a global model, and we use
this to construct and justify an exact message-passing algorithm that computes updated
beliefs for a variable in the tree. The algorithm, which is linear in the number of nodes, is
formulated entirely in terms of coherent lower previsions and is shown to satisfy a number
of rationality requirements. We supply examples of the algorithm’s operation and report an
application to on-line character recognition that illustrates the advantages of our approach
for prediction. We comment on the perspectives, opened by the availability, for the first
time, of a truly efficient algorithm based on epistemic irrelevance.
© 2010 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
The last twenty years havewitnessed a rapid growth of graphicalmodels in the fields of artificial intelligence and statistics.
These models combine graphs and probability to address complex multivariate problems in a variety of domains, such as
medicine, finance, risk analysis, defence, and environment, to name just a few.
Much has been done also on the front of imprecise probability. In particular, credal nets [1] have been and still are the
subject of intense research. A credal net creates a global model of a domain by combining local uncertainty models using
some notion of independence and then uses this to do inference. The local models represent uncertainty by closed convex
sets of probabilities, also called credal sets.
The notion of independence used with credal nets in the vast majority of cases is that of strong independence (with some
exceptions in [2]). Loosely speaking, two variables X,Y are strongly independent if the credal set for (X,Y) can be regarded as
originating from a number of precise models in each of which X and Y are stochastically independent. Strong independence
is closely related to the sensitivity analysis interpretation of credal sets, which regards an imprecise model as arising out of
partial ignorance of a precise one.
In the particular case of credal nets, strong independence leads to a mathematical equivalence: a credal net model is
equivalent to a model consisting of a set of Bayesian nets, each with the same graph but with different values for the
parameters. The sensitivity analysis interpretation is then that there is some (kind of ideal) Bayesian net model of the
problemunder consideration, and the graph of such a net is known. But, for some reason, the net’s parameters are not known
precisely, and that is why one considers the set of all the Bayesian nets that are consistent with the partial specification of
the parameters. Common causes for the existence of partial knowledge are the cost of, and time constraints on, eliciting
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parameters, and disagreement amongst a group of experts consulted for that purpose. Non-ignorable missing data can be
another reason, in case the parameters are inferred from a data set [3].
The sensitivity analysis interpretation of imprecise-probability models, and hence strong independence, is not always
applicable. A notable case ariseswhen onewishes tomodel an expert’s beliefs: it is then not always tenable that there should
be some ideal Bayesian net that models these beliefs, and that it is only because of our limited resources that we cannot
define it precisely. Rather, it seemsmore reasonable to concede that expert knowledge may be inherently imprecise to some
extent. 1 This simple observationmakes the sensitivity analysis interpretation fail, and hence it makes strong independence
an inadequate model, in general, for such a situation. 2
An alternative and attractive approach in expressing irrelevance that is not committed to the sensitivity analysis inter-
pretation is offered by epistemic irrelevance [4]: we say that X is epistemically irrelevant to Y if observing X does not affect
our beliefs about Y . In other words, by making an epistemic irrelevance assessment, a subject states that her belief model
about Y does (or will) not change after receiving information about X . When the belief model is a precise probability, both
epistemic irrelevance and strong independence reduce to the usual (stochastic) independence. 3 But when the model is a
set of probabilities, this is no longer the case, because in contradistinction with strong independence, epistemic irrelevance
is a property of this set that cannot be explained using properties of the precise probabilities in the set. Epistemic irrelevance
is defined directly in terms of a subject’s belief model (the set of probabilities). For this reason, it is very well suited for
a behavioural theory of imprecise probability. Contrary to strong independence, it is not a symmetrical notion: generally
speaking, the epistemic irrelevance of X to Y does not entail the epistemic irrelevance of Y to X . It is also weaker than strong
independence, in the sense that strong independence implies epistemic irrelevance: sets of probabilities that correspond to
assessments of epistemic irrelevance usually include those related to strong independence assessments. It therefore does
not lead to overconfident inferences when the sensitivity analysis interpretation is not justified.
At this point, the question we address in this paper should be clear: can we define credal nets based on epistemic
irrelevance, and moreover create an exact algorithm to perform efficient inferences with them? We give a fully positive
answer to this question in the special case that (i) the graph under consideration is a directed tree, and (ii) the related
variables assume finitely many values. The intuitions that showed us the way towards this result originated in previous
work done by some of us on imprecise probability trees [5] and imprecise Markov chains [6].
How do we address this problem?
In Section 2, we discuss some preliminary graph-theoretic notions, and define the local uncertainty models that will be
used at each node of a tree. These models are formalised through the language of coherent lower previsions [4]. We discuss
how such local models will give rise to a global uncertaintymodel, which plays the same role as the jointmass function built
by the chain rule in a Bayesian net. Based on the global model, we state the Markov condition that defines the imprecise-
probability interpretation of our credal trees. As announced before, this Markov condition involves epistemic irrelevance
rather than strong independence.
In Section 3, we take a brief detour to discuss in general terms how to combine marginal models into joint ones using
irrelevance assessments, in a way that is as conservative as possible. We do so because the notion of the so-called epistemic
independence, which arises out of a symmetrisation of epistemic irrelevance, has so far been defined in the literature only for
the case of two variables. We define and discuss the independent natural extension of a number of marginals. This is themost
conservative joint model that arises out of the marginals and epistemic independence alone. Moreover, we show that the
independent natural extension has a very important strong factorisation property, which has a crucial part in our algorithm
for updating credal trees under epistemic irrelevance.
In Section 4, we turn to the problem of constructing the most conservative global model based only on the local models
in the tree and our Markov condition. We show that this task can be achieved by a recursive construction that proceeds
from the leaves to the root of the tree using two operations: the independent natural extension, discussed in Section 3, and
the marginal extension, defined and studied in [4,7]. We also show that all uncertainty models we consider, the local ones
as well as the global ones that we create, satisfy a consistency criterion that generalises (and is based on the same ideas as)
the usual consistency criterion in Bayesian nets: they are (separately and jointly) coherent [4,8–10] (see in particular [11,
Section 8.1]). This is an important rationality requirement.
We briefly comment on some of the graphical separation criteria induced by epistemic irrelevance in Section 5. We then
go on to develop and justify an algorithm for making inferences on credal trees under epistemic irrelevance in Section 6.
The algorithm is used to update the tree: it computes posterior beliefs about a target variable in the tree conditional on the
observation of other variables, which are called instantiated, meaning that their value is determined. It can in particular be
used for treating the model as an expert system.
Our algorithm is based on message passing, as are the traditional algorithms that have been developed for precise
graphical models. It has some remarkable properties: (i) it works in time linear in the number of nodes in the tree; (ii) it
natively computesposterior lower andupperprevisions (or expectations) rather thanprobabilities; (iii) it is thefirst algorithm
developed for credal nets that exclusively uses the formalism of coherent lower previsions; and (iv) it is shown that, under
1 For a detailed argumentation and exposition of this point of view, we refer to [4, Chapter 5].
2 Obviously, there will be special cases where strong independence is justified in order to model an expert’s knowledge. Moreover, strong independence could
provide a good approximation to more accurate models, even when it is not entirely appropriate. This is something that seems to deserve further investigation.
3 If we ignore issues related to events with probability zero.
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verymild conditions, using the tree for updating beliefs cannot lead to inferences that are inconsistent with the local models
we have started from, nor with one another.
We give a step-by-step example of the way inferences can be done using our algorithm in Section 7. We also comment
there on the intriguing relationship between the failure of certain classical separation properties in our framework, and
dilation [12,13].
The lastpartof thepaper focusesonnumerical simulations. InSection8weempiricallymeasure theamountof imprecision
introduced by using epistemic irrelevance rather than strong independence in a credal tree, when propagating inferences
backwards (towards the root) from instantiated nodes to the target node. Indeed, it can be shown [5] that there is no
difference between inferences that go forward from instantiated nodes to the target node under strong independence and
epistemic irrelevance. In Section 9, we present an application of our algorithm to on-line character recognition. We learn
the probabilities from data and compare the predictions of our approach with those of its precise probability counterpart.
The results are encouraging: they show that the tree can be used for real applications and that the imprecision it originates
is justified.
In order to keep this paper reasonably short, we have to assume that the reader has a good working knowledge of the
basics ofWalley’s [4] theory of coherent lower previsions. This is needed inparticular for themost important proofs, collected
in the Appendix. For a fairly detailed discussion of the coherence notions and results needed in the context of this paper, we
refer to recent work by Miranda [8,9].
2. Credal trees under epistemic irrelevance
2.1. Basic notions and notation
We consider a rooted and directed discrete treewith finitewidth and depth.We call T the set of its nodes s, andwe denote
the root, or initial, node by. For any node s, we denote itsmother node bym(s). Of course, has no mother node, and we
use the convention m() = ∅. Also, for each node s, we denote the set of its children by C(s), and the set of its siblings by
S(s). Clearly, S() = ∅, and if s =  then S(s) = C(m(s)) \ {s}. If C(s) = ∅, then we call s a leaf, or terminal node. We
denote by T♦ := {s ∈ T : C(s) = ∅} the set of all non-terminal nodes.
For nodes s and t, we write s  t if s precedes t, i.e., if there is a directed segment in the tree from s to t. The relation is
a special partial order on the set T . A(s) := {t ∈ T : t  s} denotes the chain of ancestors of s and D(s) := {t ∈ T : s  t} its
set of descendants. Here s  t means that s  t and s = t. We also use the notation ↑s := A(s)∪ {s} for the chain (segment)
connecting  and s, and ↓s := D(s) ∪ {s} for the sub-tree with root s. Similarly, we let ↑S := ⋃{↑s : s ∈ S} and ↓S :=⋃{↓s : s ∈ S} for any subset S ⊆ T . For any node s, its set of non-parent non-descendants is given by s := T \ ({m(s)} ∪↓s).
With each node s of the tree, there is associated a variable Xs assuming values in a non-empty finite setXs. We denote by
L (Xs) the set of all real-valued maps (also called gambles) onXs. We extend this notation to more complicated situations
as follows. If S is any subset of T , then we denote by XS the tuple of variables whose components are the Xs for all s ∈ S.
This new joint variable assumes values in the finite setXS := ×s∈SXs, and the corresponding set of gambles is denoted by
L (XS).
4 Generic elements ofXs are denoted by xs or zs. Similarly for xS and zS inXS . Also, if wemention a tuple zS , then for
any t ∈ S, the corresponding element in the tuple will be denoted by zt . We assume all variables in the tree to be logically
independent, meaning that the variable XS may assume all values inXS , for all ∅ ⊆ S ⊆ T .
We will frequently use the simplifying device of identifying a gamble fS onXS with its cylindrical extension toXU , where
S ⊆ U ⊆ T . This is the gamble fU onXU defined by fU(xU) := fS(xS) for all xU ∈ XU . To give an example, ifK ⊆ L (XT ),
this trick allows us to considerK ∩L (XS) as the set of those gambles inK that depend only on the variable XS . As another
example, this device allows us to identify the gambles I{xS} and I{xS}×XT\S , and therefore also the events {xS} and {xS}×XT\S .
More generally, for any event A ⊆ XS , we can identify the gambles IA and IA×XT\S , and therefore also the events A and
A×XT\S . In the same spirit, a lower prevision on all gambles inL (XS) can be identified with a lower prevision defined on
the set of corresponding gambles onXT , a subset ofL (XT ).
Throughout the paper, we consider (conditional) lower previsions as models for a subject’s beliefs about the values that
certain variables in the tree may assume. We use a systematic notation for such (conditional) lower previsions. Let I,O ⊆ T
be disjoint sets of nodeswithO = ∅, thenwe generically 5 denote by VO(·|XI) a conditional lower prevision, defined on the set
of gamblesL (XI∪O). 6 For every gamble f onXI∪O and every xI ∈ XI , VO(f |xI) is the lower prevision (or lower expectation,
or a subject’s supremum buying price) for/of the gamble f , conditional on the event that XI = xI . We interpret VO(f |XI) as
a real-valued map (gamble) onXI that assumes the value VO(f |xI) in the element xI ofXI . The conjugate conditional upper
prevision VO(·|XI) is defined onL (XI∪O) by VO(f |XI) := −VO(−f |XI) for all gambles f onXI∪O.
4 For any subset S of T ,XS is defined formally as the set of all maps xS from S to
⋃
s∈SXs , such that xS(s) = xs ∈ Xs for all s ∈ S. So when S = ∅, the empty
productX∅ is defined as the set of all maps from ∅ to ∅, which is a singleton. The corresponding variable X∅ can then only assume this single value, so there is
no uncertainty about it.L (X∅) can be identified with the setR of real numbers.
5 Besides the letter V , we will also use the letters P, Q and R.
6 In keeping with the observation in footnote 4, we also allow I = ∅, which means conditioning on the variable XI = X∅ , which can only assume one single
value. This means that VO(·|X∅) =: VO effectively becomes an unconditional lower prevision onL (XO∪∅) = L (XO). This a very useful device that allows us
to use the same generic notation for both conditional and unconditional lower previsions.
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We will always implicitly assume that all conditional models VO(·|XI) we use are separately coherent, meaning that:
SC1. VO(f |xI) ≥ minzO∈XO f (xI, zO) for all f ∈ L (XI∪O) and all xI ∈ XI [accepting partial gains];
SC2. VO(f1 + f2|xI) ≥ VO(f1|xI) + VO(f2|xI) for all f1, f2 ∈ L (XI∪O) and all xI ∈ XI [super-additivity];
SC3. VO(λf |xI) = λVO(f |xI) for all f ∈ L (XI∪O), all non-negative real λ and all xI ∈ XI [non-negative homogeneity].
By combining SC1–SC3, it follows that for all f ∈ L (XI∪O), xI ∈ XI and zO ∈ XO:
min
zO∈XO
f (xI, zO) ≤ VO(f |xI) ≤ VO(f |xI) ≤ max
zO∈XO
f (xI, zO).
Ifwe let f be the indicator I{zI} of the set {zI} in these inequalities, they reduce to the following, intuitively obvious, property: 7
SC4. VO({zI} ×XO|xI) = VO({zI} ×XO|xI) = I{xI}(zI) for all xI, zI ∈ XI .
From SC1, SC2 and SC4 we can also derive that, with obvious notations:
VO(f |xI) = VO(I{xI}f |xI) = VO(f (xI, ·)|xI) for all gambles f onXI∪O and xI ∈ XI, (1)
where f (xI, ·) is a partial map defined on XO. This implies that VO(·|XI) is completely determined by its behaviour on
(cylindrical extensions of maps in)L (XO).
Hereafter, wewill frequently introduce conditional lower previsions of the type VO(·|XI) as if they are defined onL (XO),
simply because that is a very natural thing to do: such a conditional lower prevision is usually interpreted as representing
beliefs about the variable XO, conditional on values of the variable XI . But the reader should keep inmind that, by the separate
coherence property (1), VO(·|XI) can (and should) always be uniquely extended to the larger domainL (XI∪O).
As soon as we consider a number of such conditional lower previsions VOk(·|XIk), k = 1, . . . , n, they should satisfy more
stringent consistency criteria than that each of them should be separately coherent: they should also be consistent with one
another in the sense of Walley’s (joint) coherence [4, Section 7.1.4(b)]. For more details about this much more involved type
of coherence, we refer also to [8,9].
Finally, let us introduce one of the most important concepts for this paper, that of epistemic irrelevance. We describe the
case of conditional irrelevance, as the unconditional version of epistemic irrelevance can easily be recovered as a special
case. 8
Consider three disjoint subsets C, I, and O of N, where both I and O are non-empty. When a subject judges XI to be
epistemically irrelevant to XO conditional on XC , he assumes that if he knows the value of XC , then learning in addition which
value XI assumes inXI will not affect his beliefs about XO. More formally, assume that a subject has a separately coherent
conditional lower prevision VO(·|XC) onL (XO). If he assesses XI to be epistemically irrelevant to XO conditional on XC , this
implies that he can infer from his model VO(·|XC) a conditional model VO(·|XC∪I) onL (XO) given by
VO(f |xC∪I) := VO(f |xC) for all f ∈ L (XO) and all xC∪I ∈ XC∪I .
2.2. Local uncertainty models
We now add a local uncertainty model to each of the nodes s. If s is not the root node, i.e., has a mother m(s), then this
local model is a (separately coherent) conditional lower prevision Q
s
(·|Xm(s)) onL (Xs): for each possible value zm(s) of the
variable Xm(s) associatedwith itsmotherm(s), we have a coherent lower previsionQs(·|zm(s)) for the value of Xs, conditional
on Xm(s) = zm(s). In the root, we have an unconditional local uncertainty model Q for the value of X. Q is a (separately)
coherent lower prevision onL (X). We use the common generic notation Qs(·|Xm(s)) for all these local models. 9
2.3. Global uncertainty models
We intend to show in Section 4 how all these local models Q
s
(·|Xm(s)) can be combined into global uncertainty models.
We generically denote such global models using the letter P. More specifically, we want to end up with an unconditional
joint lower prevision P := P↓ = PT onL (XT ) for all variables in the tree, as well as conditional lower previsions P↓S(·|Xs)
onL (X↓S) for all non-terminal nodes s and all non-empty S ⊆ C(s).
7 ForanyeventA ⊆ XI∪O ,wedenoteVO(IA|xI)alsoasVO(A|xI)andcall this realnumber the (conditional) lowerprobabilityofA. SimilarlyVO(A|xI) := VO(IA|xI)
is the (conditional) upper probability of A.
8 It suffices, in the discussion below, to let C = ∅. As we indicated in footnote 4, this makes sure the variable XC has only one possible value, so conditioning
on that variable amounts to not conditioning at all.
9 We can do this because Xm() = X∅ has only one possible value, so conditioning on that variable amounts to not conditioning at all.
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Ideally, we want these global (conditional) lower previsions (i) to be compatible with the local assessments Q
s
(·|Xm(s)), s ∈ T,
(ii) to be coherent with one another, and (iii) to reflect the conditional irrelevancies (or Markov-type conditions) that we want
the graphical structure of the tree to encode. In addition, we want them (iv) to be as conservative (small) as possible.
In this list, the only item that needs more explanation concerns the Markov-type conditions that the tree structure
encodes. This is what we turn to now.
2.4. The interpretation of the graphical model
In classical Bayesian nets, the graphical structure is taken to represent the following assessments: for any node s, condi-
tional on its parent variables, its non-parent non-descendant variables are epistemically irrelevant to it (and therefore also
independent).
In the present context, we assume that the tree structure embodies the following conditional irrelevance assessment,
which turns out to be equivalent with the conditional independence assessment mentioned above in the special case of a
Bayesian tree.
CI. Consider any node s in the tree, any subset S of its set of children C(s), and the set S := ⋂c∈S c of their common
non-parent non-descendants. Then conditional on themother variable Xs, the non-parent non-descendant variables XS are
assumed to be epistemically irrelevant to the variables X↓S associated with the children in S and their descendants.
This interpretation turns the tree into a credal tree under epistemic irrelevance, and we also introduce the term imprecise
Markov tree (IMT) for it. For the global models we are considering here, CI has the following consequences. It implies that
for all s ∈ T♦, all non-empty S ⊆ C(s) and all I ⊆ S, we can infer from P↓S(·|Xs) a model P↓S(·|X{s}∪I), where for all
z{s}∪I ∈ X{s}∪I , with obvious notations: 10
P↓S(f |z{s}∪I) := P↓S(f (·, zI)|zs) for all gambles f inL (X↓S∪I), (2)
where f (·, zI) denotes a partial map of f , defined onX↓S .
We discuss some of the separation properties that accompany this interpretation in Section 5. For now, we focus on two
immediate consequences that will help us to go from local to global models in Section 4.
First, consider some node s. Then CI tells us that for any two children c1, c2 ∈ C(s) of s, the variable X↓c1 is epistemically
irrelevant to the variable X↓c2 , conditional on Xs.
It even tells us that for any two disjoint non-empty sets S1 ⊆ C(s) and S2 ⊆ C(s) of children of s, the variable X↓S1 is
epistemically irrelevant toX↓S2 , conditional onXs.We conclude that, conditional on anode, all its children c (and the variables
associated with their sub-trees ↓c) are epistemically independent [4, Chapter 9], in the specific sense to be discussed in the
next section.
Next, consider some non-terminal node s different from , and its mother variable Xm(s). We infer from CI that this
mother variable Xm(s) is epistemically irrelevant to the variable X↓C(s) conditional on Xs:
3. Independent natural extension
Let us make a small digression on epistemic independence, which will help us in our discussion further on. The material
in this section is based on the work that some of us have published elsewhere [14], and we refer to that paper for more
details and proofs for the results mentioned in this section.
10 For leaves s, the corresponding irrelevance condition is trivial, as the set C(s) of children of s is empty.
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3.1. Independent products
Suppose we have a number of (separately) coherent marginal lower previsions Pn onL (Xn) representing beliefs about
the values that each of a finite number of (logically independent) variables Xn assume in the respective non-empty finite
setsXn, n ∈ N, where N is some non-empty finite index set.
We want to construct a joint lower prevision PN on L (XN), where XN = ×n∈NXn, that coincides with the marginals
Pn on their respective domainsL (Xn), and such that this PN reflects the following structural assessments: for any disjoint
proper subsets O and I of N, the variables XI are epistemically irrelevant to the variables XO. In other words, learning the
value of any number of these variables would not affect beliefs about the remaining variables. We then call the variables Xn,
n ∈ N, epistemically independent.
Generally speaking, such irrelevance assessments are useful because they allowus to turn unconditional lower previsions
into conditional lower previsions. In particular, for any disjoint proper subsets O and I of N, we can use the epistemic
irrelevance assessment of XI to XO to infer from the joint lower prevision PN a conditional lower prevision PO(·|XI) on
L (XO∪I) given by:
PO(h|zI) := PN(h(·, zI)) for all gambles h onXO∪I and all zI ∈ XI.
So we can use the symmetrised assessment of epistemic independence of the variables Xn, n ∈ N, to infer from PN the
following family of conditional lower previsions:
I (PN) := {PO(·|XI) : O and I disjoint proper subsets of N}.
This idea leads to the definition of an independent product, which generalises the existing notion for (precise) probability
models.
Definition 1. A (separately) coherent lower prevision PN on L (XN) that coincides with the marginal lower previsions Pn
on their domains L (Xn), n ∈ N, and that is coherent with the family of conditional lower previsions I (PN) is called an
independent product 11 of these marginals Pn.
It turns out that there always is a point-wise smallest independent product:
Proposition 1. Any collection of (separately) coherent lower previsions Pn on L (Xn), n ∈ N, has a point-wise smallest
independent product. We call it their independent natural extension and denote it by⊗n∈NPn. Moreover,⊗n∈NPn is a strongly
factorising coherent lower prevision onL (XN).
Strong factorisation is strongly linked with independent products, and will play a crucial part in our development of an
algorithm for updating an imprecise Markov tree in Section 6. It is defined as follows:
Definition 2. We call a (separately) coherent lower prevision PN on L (XN) strongly factorising if for all disjoint proper
subsets O and I of N, all g ∈ L (XO) and all non-negative f ∈ L (XI), PN(fg) = PN(f PN(g)).
As another important example, the so-called strong product ×n∈NPn [1] of marginal lower previsions Pn is strongly
factorising. 12
As a consequence of the separate coherence of the joint lower prevision PN , the right-hand side of the equality in this
definition can be rewritten as:
PN(f PN(g)) =
{
PN(f )PN(g) if PN(g) ≥ 0,
PN(f )PN(g) if PN(g) ≤ 0,
which explains where the term ‘factorising’ comes from. In particular, for any (separately) coherent strongly factorising joint
lower prevision PN , we see that for any partition N1, . . . ,Nm of N:
PN
(×mk=1Ak) =
m∏
k=1
PN(Ak) and PN
(×mk=1Ak) =
m∏
k=1
PN(Ak), (3)
where Ak ⊆ XNk for k = 1, . . . ,m.
11 In [14], we distinguish between many-to-many and many-to-one independent products. It is not necessary to make this distinction here, but whenever we
use the term ‘independent product’ in the present paper, we implicitly refer to the more stringent many-to-many version introduced there.
12 This type of independent product comes to the fore in a study of credal nets under strong independence.
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The independent natural extension has very interesting and non-trivialmarginalisation and associativity properties. Con-
sider any non-empty subset R of N, then the independent natural extension ⊗r∈RPr of the marginals Pr , r ∈ R, coincides
with the restriction of ⊗n∈NPn to the set of gamblesL (XR):(⊗r∈RPr) (g) = (⊗n∈NPn) (g) for all gambles g onXR. (4)
Moreover, for any partition N1 and N2 of N, we have that
⊗n∈NPn =
(
⊗n1∈N1Pn1
)
⊗
(
⊗n2∈N2Pn2
)
, (5)
so⊗n∈NPn is the independent natural extension of itsXN1 -marginal⊗n1∈N1Pn1 and itsXN2 -marginal ⊗n2∈N2Pn2 .
3.2. Regular extension
As a next step, suppose we want to condition a separately coherent and strongly factorising joint PN on observations of
the type XI = zI , where I is some proper subset of N. In other words, we want to find conditional lower previsions PO(·|XI)
on L (XI∪O) that are (jointly) coherent with the joint lower prevision PN . To this end, we calculate the so-called regular
extension as follows. Consider zI inXI . When PN({zI}) > 0,
R(h|zI) := max{μ ∈ R : PN(I{zI}[h − μ]) ≥ 0},
where O is any non-empty subset of N \ I and h is any gamble onXI∪O. When PN({zI}) = 0, R(·|xI) is vacuous, meaning that
R(h|zI) = minxO∈XO h(zI, xO) for all gambles h onXI∪O.
Generally speaking, coherence only determines PO(·|zI) uniquely if PN({zI}) > 0, and in that case regular extension
yields this uniquely coherent conditional lower prevision: PO(·|zI) = R(·|zI). When PN({zI}) = 0, regular extension is still
coherent, and it even still characterises the coherent PO(·|zI), because these all lie between the vacuous lower prevision and
R(·|zI). For more details about this regular extension, we refer to [4, Appendix J]; [9, Section 4].
If the joint PN is strongly factorising, we get:
PN(I{xI}[h − μ]) = PN(I{xI}PN(h(xI, ·) − μ))
=
{
PN({xI})[PN(h(xI, ·)) − μ] if PN(h(xI, ·)) ≥ μ,
PN({xI})[PN(h(xI, ·)) − μ] if PN(h(xI, ·)) ≤ μ,
so we conclude that, quite interestingly,
R(h|xI) = PN(h(xI, ·)) as soon as PN({xI}) > 0. (6)
In otherwords, the conditional lower previsions found by regular extension of a strongly factorising joint satisfy all epistemic
irrelevance conditions present in an assessment of epistemic independence. We shall have occasion to use this idea several
times in the course of this paper, especially in the proofs.
3.3. Conditionally independent products
To end this section, we generalise the notion of an independent product to that of a conditionally independent product.
In this casewe have a number of ‘marginal’ conditional lower previsions Pn(·|Y) onL (Xn) representing beliefs (conditional
on a variable Y in a finite set Y ) about the values that each of a finite number of (logically independent) variables Xn assume
in the respective non-empty finite setsXn, n ∈ N.
We want to construct a conditional lower prevision PN(·|Y) on L (XN), whereXN = ×n∈NXn, that coincides with the
marginal conditional lower previsions Pn(·|Y) on their respective domains L (Xn), and such that this PN(·|Y) reflects the
following structural assessments: for any disjoint proper subsets O and I of N, the variables XI are epistemically irrelevant
to the variables XO, conditional on Y . In other words, if the value of Y was known, then learning the value of any number of
these variables would not affect beliefs about the remaining variables. We then call the variables Xn, n ∈ N, epistemically
independent conditional on Y .
Generally speaking, such conditional irrelevance assessments are useful because they allow us to turn lower previsions
conditional on Y alone into other, more involved conditional lower previsions. In particular, for any disjoint proper subsets
O and I of N, we can use the epistemic irrelevance assessment of XI to XO conditional on Y to infer from the joint lower
prevision PN(·|Y) a conditional lower prevision PO(·|XI,Y) onL (XO∪I) [or equivalently onL (XO∪I × Y )] given by:
PO(h|zI,y) := PN(h(·,zI)|y) for all gambles h onXO∪I and all zI ∈ XI.
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So we can use the symmetrised assessment of epistemic independence of the variables Xn, n ∈ N conditional on Y to infer
from the PN(·|Y) the following family of conditional lower previsions:
I (PN(·|Y)) := {PO(·|XI,Y) : O and I disjoint proper subsets of N}.
This idea leads to the definition of a conditionally independent product.
Definition 3. A (separately) coherent conditional lower prevision PN(·|Y) on L (XN) that coincides with the ‘marginal’
conditional lower previsions Pn(·|Y) on their domains L (Xn), n ∈ N, and that is coherent with the family of conditional
lower previsions I (PN(·|Y)) is called a conditionally independent product of these marginals Pn(·|Y).
It turns out that there always is a point-wise smallest conditionally independent product:
Proposition 2. Any collection of (separately) coherent conditional lower previsions Pn(·|Y) on L (Xn), n ∈ N, has a point-
wise smallest conditionally independent product. We call it their conditionally independent natural extension and denote it by
⊗n∈NPn(·|Y).
The notation we use for the conditionally independent natural extension is appropriately suggestive: for each y in Y ,
⊗n∈NPn(·|y) is indeed the independent natural extension of the marginal lower previsions Pn(·|y). This implies that each⊗n∈NPn(·|y) is a strongly factorising coherent lower prevision onL (XN).
We are now ready to go back to our discussion of imprecise Markov trees.
4. Constructing the most conservative joint
Let us show how to construct specific global models for the variables in the tree, and argue that these are the most
conservative coherent models that extend the local models and express all conditional irrelevancies (2), encoded in the
imprecise Markov tree. In Section 6, we will use these global models to construct and justify an algorithm for updating the
imprecise Markov tree.
The crucial step lies in the recognition that any tree can be constructed recursively from the leaves up to the root, by
using basic building blocks of the following type:
The global models are then also constructed recursively, following the same pattern. In what follows, we first derive the
recursion equations for these global models in a heuristic manner. The real justification for using the global models thus
derived is then given in Theorem 5.
Consider a node s and suppose that, in each of its children c ∈ C(s), we already have a global conditional lower prevision
P↓c(·|Xs) onL (X↓c) (or equivalently, onL (X{s}∪↓c)).
Given that, conditional on Xs, the variables X↓c , c ∈ C(s) are epistemically independent (see Section 2.4, condition CI), the
discussion in Section 3 leads us to combine the ‘marginals’ P↓c(·|Xs), c ∈ C(s) into their point-wise smallest conditionally
independent product (conditionally independent natural extension)⊗c∈C(s)P↓c(·|Xs), which is a conditional lower prevision
P↓C(s)(·|Xs) onL (X↓C(s)) (or equivalently, onL (X↓s)):
Next, we need to combine the conditional models Q
s
(·|Xm(s)) and P↓C(s)(·|Xs) into a global conditional model about X↓s.
Given that, conditional on Xs, the variable Xm(s) is epistemically irrelevant to the variable X↓C(s) (see Section 2.4, condi-
tion CI), we expect P↓C(s)(·|X{m(s),s}) and P↓C(s)(·|Xs) to coincide [this is a special instance of Eq. (2)]. The most conservative
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(point-wise smallest) coherent way of combining the conditional lower previsions P↓C(s)(·|X{m(s),s}) and Qs(·|Xm(s)) con-
sists in taking their marginal extension 13 Q
s
(P↓C(s)(·|X{m(s),s})|Xm(s)) = Qs(P↓C(s)(·|Xs)|Xm(s)); see [4,7] for more details.
Graphically:
Summarising, and also accounting for the case s = , we can construct a global conditional lower prevision P↓s(·|Xm(s))
onL (X↓s) by backwards recursion:
P↓C(s)(·|Xs) := ⊗c∈C(s)P↓c(·|Xs), (7)
P↓s(·|Xm(s)) := Qs(P↓C(s)(·|Xs)|Xm(s)) = Qs(⊗c∈C(s)P↓c(·|Xs)|Xm(s)), (8)
for all s ∈ T♦. If we start with the ‘boundary conditions’
P↓t(·|Xm(t)) := Qt(·|Xm(t)) for all leaves t, (9)
then the recursion relations (7) and (8) eventually lead to the global joint model P = P↓(·|Xm()), and to the global
conditional models P↓C(s)(·|Xs) for all non-terminal nodes s. For any subset S ⊆ C(s), the global conditional model P↓S(·|Xs)
can then be defined simply as the restriction of the model P↓C(s)(·|Xs) onL (X↓C(s)) to the setL (X↓S):
P↓S(g|Xs) := P↓C(s)(g|Xs) for all gambles g onX↓S. (10)
It follows from the discussion in Section 3 that, alternatively (see Eq. (4)),
P↓S(·|Xs) = ⊗c∈SP↓c(·|Xs). (11)
For easy reference, we will in what follows refer to this collection of global models as the family of global models T (P), so
T (P) := {P} ∪ {P↓S(·|Xs) : s ∈ T♦ and non-empty S ⊆ C(s)}.
We end this section by discussing a number of interesting properties for the family of global models T (P)we can derive
in this way. Let us call any real functional Φ onL (X) strictly positive if Φ(I{x}) > 0 for all x ∈ X.
Proposition 3. If all the local models Qs(·|Xm(s)), s ∈ T are strictly positive, then so are all the global models in T (P).
Proposition 4. Consider any non-empty subset E of T and any xE ∈ XE. If P({xE}) > 0 then also P↓c({xE∩↓c}|xe) > 0 for all
e ∈ E and all c ∈ C(e). 14
Before we formulate the most important result in this section (and arguably, in this paper), we provide somemotivation.
Suppose we have some family of global models
T (V) := {V } ∪ {V↓S(·|Xs) : s ∈ T♦ and non-empty S ⊆ C(s)}
associated with the tree. How do we express that such a family is compatible with the assessments encoded in the tree?
First of all, we require that our global models should extend the local models:
T1. For each s ∈ T , Q
s
(·|Xm(s)) is the restriction of V↓s(·|Xm(s)) toL (Xs).
The second requirement is that our models should satisfy the rationality requirement of coherence:
T2. The (conditional) lower previsions in T (V) are jointly coherent.
13 Marginal extension is, in the special case of precise probability models, also known as the law of total probability, or the law or iterated expectations.
14 Observe that this holds trivially also if E∩↓c = ∅, because thenXE∩↓c = X∅ is a singleton (see footnote 4) whose upper probability should be 1 by separate
coherence.
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The third requirement requires more explanation: the global models should reflect all epistemic irrelevancies encoded
in the graphical structure of the tree. Naively, we would want condition (2) to be satisfied. The problem is that only the
right-hand side in Eq. (2), involving the model V↓S(·|Xs), is directly available to us. To get to the left-hand side involving
the model V↓S(·|X{s}∪I), one naive approach would be to ‘condition the joint model V = VT on the variable X{s}∪I ’. But we
have seen in Section 3.1 that given a joint model, coherence in general only determines the conditional models uniquely,
provided that the lower probability of the conditioning event is non-zero. This is a fairly strong condition, and inwhat follows
we would generally prefer to work with the much weaker condition that the upper probability of the conditioning event is
non-zero. 15 Since in that case the left-hand side of Eq. (2) need not be uniquely determined from the joint V by coherence,
this approach becomes unfeasible.
Nevertheless, as soon as we realise that all we can reasonably require from our models is that they should be coherent,
the right approach readily suggests itself: 16 we should require that if we use the available models V↓S(·|Xs) to define the
models V↓S(·|X{s}∪I) through the epistemic irrelevance condition (2), then the result should still be coherent:
T3. If we define the conditional lower previsions V↓S(·|X{s}∪I), s ∈ T♦, S ⊆ C(s) and R ⊆ S through the epistemic
irrelevance requirements
V↓S(f |z{s}∪R) := V↓S(f (·, zR)|zs) for all gambles f inL (X↓S∪R),
then all these models together should be (jointly) coherent with all the available models in the family T (V).
And there is a final requirement, which guarantees that all inferences we make on the basis of our global models are as
conservative as possible, and are therefore based on no other considerations than what are encoded in the tree:
T4. Themodels in the familyT (V) are dominated (point-wise) by the correspondingmodels in all other families satisfying
requirements T1–T3.
It turns out that the family of models T (P) we have been constructing above satisfies all these requirements.
Theorem 5. If all local models Qs(·|Xm(s)) onL (Xs), s ∈ T are strictly positive, then the family of global modelsT (P), obtained
through Eqs. (7)–(10), constitutes the point-wise smallest family of (conditional) lower previsions that satisfy T1–T3. It is therefore
the unique family to also satisfy T4. Finally, consider any non-empty set of nodes E ⊆ T and the corresponding conditional lower
prevision derived by applying regular extension: 17
R(f |xE) := max{μ ∈ R : P↓T (I{xE}[f − μ]) ≥ 0} for all f ∈ L (XT ) and all xE ∈ XE.
Then the conditional lower prevision R(·|XE) is (jointly) coherent with the global models in the family T (P).
The last statement of this theorem guarantees that if we use regular extension to update the tree given evidence XE = xE ,
i.e., derive conditional models R(·|xE) from the joint model P = P↓T , such inferences will always be coherent. This is of
particular relevance for the discussion in Section 6,wherewederive an efficient algorithm for updating the tree using regular
extension. It implies in particular that our algorithm produces coherent inferences.
5. Some separation properties
Without going into too much detail, we would like to point out some of the more striking differences between the
separation properties in imprecise Markov trees under epistemic irrelevance, and the more usual ones that are valid for
Bayesian nets [15], which, by the way, are also inherited from Bayesian nets by credal nets under strong independence [1].
It is clear from the interpretation of the graphical model described in Section 2.4 that we have the following simple
separation results:
where in both cases, Xi2 separates Xt from Xi1 : when the value of Xi2 is known, additional information about the value of Xi1
does not affect beliefs about the value of Xt . In this figure, between i1 and i2, and between i2 and t, theremay be other nodes,
15 As the results in [14] suggest, it might be possible to go even further, and prove a counterpart to Theorem 5with no positivity restrictions on the local models.
We leave this as an avenue for future research, however.
16 This is also the approach implicit in Definition 1, as well as the one used in [14]. It coincides with the usual, naive approach as soon as all the relevant
conditional models are uniquely determined from the joint by coherence.
17 If we look at the proof of this result in the Appendix, it is not hard to see that similar statements can be made about the (joint) coherence of the regular
extensions R(·|XEk ) for any finite collection Ek , k = 1, . . . , n of sets of nodes.
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but the arrows along the path segment through these nodes should all point in the indicated directions. The underlying idea
is that t is a (descendant of some) child c of i2, and conditional on the mother i2 of c, the non-parent non-descendant i1 of c
is epistemically irrelevant to c and all of its descendants.
On the other hand, and in contradistinction with what we are used to in Bayesian nets, we will not generally have
separation in the following configuration:
where Xi2 does not necessarily separate Xt from Xi1 . We will come across a simple counterexample in Section 7. Where does
this difference with the case of Bayesian nets originate? It is clear from the reasoning above that Xi2 separates Xi1 from
Xt: conditional on Xi2 , Xt is epistemically irrelevant to Xi1 . For precise probability models, irrelevance generally implies
symmetrical independence, and therefore this will generally imply that conditional on Xi2 , Xi1 is epistemically irrelevant to
Xt as well. But for imprecise-probability models no such symmetry is guaranteed [16], and we therefore cannot infer that,
generally speaking, Xi2 will separate Xi1 from Xt . As a general rule, we can only infer separation if the arrows point from the
‘separating’ variable Xi2 towards the ‘target’ variable Xt .
6. A fast algorithm for updating in an imprecise Markov tree
We now consider the case where we are interested in making inferences about the value of the variable Xt in some target
node t, when we know the values xE of the variables XE in a set E ⊆ T \ {t} of evidence nodes; see for instance Fig. 1.
6.1. The formulation of the problem
If we assume that the values of the remaining variables are missing at random, then we can do this by conditioning the
joint P obtained above on the available evidence ‘XE = xE ’; see for instance [3,17].
We will address this problem by updating the lower prevision P to the lower prevision Rt(·|xE) on L (Xt) using regular
extension [4, Appendix J]:
Rt(g|xE) = max{μ ∈ R : P(I{xE}[g − μ]) ≥ 0} (12)
for all gambles g on Xt , assuming that P({xE}) > 0. Theorem 5 guarantees that such inferences are coherent. Sufficient
conditions on the local models for this positivity assumption to hold are given in Proposition 3.
Consider the map
ρg : R → R : μ → P(I{xE}[g − μ]).
We can infer from the separate coherence of P that |ρg(μ1) − ρg(μ2)| ≤ |μ1 − μ2|P({xE}) for all μ1,μ2 ∈ R, which
implies that ρg is (Lipschitz) continuous. Separate coherence of P also guarantees that ρg is concave and non-increasing.
Hence {μ ∈ R : ρg(μ) ≥ 0} = (−∞, Rt(g|xE)], which shows that the supremum that we should have a priori used in (12)
is indeed a maximum. Rt(g|xE) is the right-most zero of ρg , and it is, again by separate coherence of P, guaranteed to lie
between the smallest value min g and the largest value max g of g. If moreover P({xE}) > 0, then separate coherence of P
implies that Rt(g|xE) is the unique zero of ρg . If on the other hand P({xE}) = 0, then (−∞, Rt(g|xE)] is the set of all zeros of
ρg . It appears that any algorithm for calculating Rt(g|xE) will benefit from being able to calculate the values of ρg , or even
more simply check their signs, efficiently.
6.2. Calculating the values of ρg recursively
We now recall from Section 4 that the joint P can be constructed recursively from leaves to root. The idea we now
use is that calculating ρg(μ) = P(I{xE}[g − μ]) becomes easier if we graft the structure of the tree onto the argument
gμ := I{xE}[g − μ] as follows. Define
gμs :=
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
I{xs} if s ∈ E,
g − μ if s = t,
1 if s ∈ T \ (E ∪ {t}),
then g
μ
s ∈ L (Xs) and gμ = ∏s∈T gμs . Also define, for any s ∈ T , the gamble φμs onX↓s by φμs := ∏u∈↓s gμu . Then
φ
μ
 = gμ and φμs ≥ 0 if s  t,
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and
φμs = gμs
∏
c∈C(s)
φμc for all s ∈ T, (13)
where we use the convention that any product over an empty set of indices equals one. Eq. (13) is the argument counterpart
of Eq. (8). Also, if s  t then gμs and φμs do not depend on μ, nor on g. Indeed, in that case
φμs = I{xE∩↓s}. (14)
First, let us consider the nodes s  t.
We define themessages π s and π s recursively by
π s := Qs
(
gμs
∏
c∈C(s)
π c
∣∣∣Xm(s)
)
and π s := Qs
(
gμs
∏
c∈C(s)
π c
∣∣∣Xm(s)
)
. (15)
We summarise such a pair by the notation: π s := Qs(gμs
∏
c∈C(s) π c|Xm(s)) := (π s, π s). Then there are two possibilities:
π s =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
Q
s
({xs}|Xm(s))
∏
c∈C(s)
π c(xs) if s ∈ E,
Q
s
( ∏
c∈C(s)
π c
∣∣∣Xm(s)
)
if s /∈ E.
Themessagesπ s andπ s are gambles onXm(s), and can therefore be seen as tuples of real numbers,with asmany components
π s(xm(s)) as there are elements xm(s) inXm(s). They are all non-negative. As their notation suggests, they do not depend on
the choice of g or μ, but only (at most) on which nodes are instantiated, i.e., belong to E, and on which value xE the variable
XE for these instantiated nodes assumes.
It then follows from Eqs. (8) and (13) and the strong factorisation property18 that (see the Appendix for a proof)
P↓s(φμs |Xm(s)) = π s and P↓s(φμs |Xm(s)) = π s. (16)
Next, we turn to nodes s  t.
Define the messages π
μ
s by
πμs := Qs(ψμs |Xm(s)), (17)
where the gambles ψ
μ
s onXs are given by the recursion relations:
ψ
μ
t := max{g − μ, 0}
∏
c∈C(t)
π c + min{g − μ, 0}
∏
c∈C(t)
π c, (18)
and for each = s  t, som(s) exists,
ψ
μ
m(s) :=
[
max{πμs , 0}
∏
c∈S(s)
π c + min{πμs , 0}
∏
c∈S(s)
π c
]
g
μ
m(s). (19)
The messages π
μ
s are again tuples of real numbers, with one component π
μ
s (xm(s)) for each of the possible values xm(s)
of Xm(s).
19 They do depend on the choice of g or μ, as well as on which nodes are instantiated and on which value xE the
variable XE for these instantiated nodes assumes.
18 This, together with the course of reasoning leading to Eq. (20), shows that the results of updating the tree (and the algorithmwe are deriving) in this way will
be exactly the same for any way of forming a product of the local models for the children of s, provided only that this product is strongly factorising. For instance,
replacing the conditionally independent natural extension with the strong product in Eq. (7) will lead to exactly the same inferences. Of course, this should not
be taken to mean that our algorithm also works for updating credal trees under strong independence.
19 If s is the root node, thenm(s) = ∅ and πμs is a single real number, which by Eq. (20) is equal to ρg(μ). See also footnote 4.
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Fig. 1. Example imprecise Markov tree. The target node is t = 10, et = 2 is the ‘greatest’ observed ancestor of t and st = 3 is the child of et that precedes t. The
bolder arrows represent the trunk T˜ = {3, 4, 10} of the tree.
It then follows from Eqs. (8) and (13) and the strong factorisation property of the local independent products that (see
the Appendix for a proof)
P↓s(φμs |Xm(s)) = πμs and of course ρg(μ) = πμ. (20)
We conclude that we can find the value of ρg(μ) by a backwards recursionmethod consisting in passingmessages up to the
root of the tree, and in transforming them in each node using the local uncertainty models; see Eqs. (15) and (17)–(19).
There is a further simplification, because we are not necessarily interested in the actual value of ρg(μ), but rather in its
sign. It arises whenever there are instantiated nodes above the target node: E ∩ A(t) = ∅. Let in that case et be the greatest
element of the chain E∩ A(t), i.e., the instantiated node closest to and preceding the target node t, and let st be its successor
in the chain ↑t; see for instance Fig. 1. If we let
λg(μ) := max{πμst (xet ), 0}
∏
c∈S(st)
π c(xet ) + min{πμst (xet ), 0}
∏
c∈S(st)
π c(xet ),
then it follows from Eq. (19) (with s = st andm(s) = et) thatψμet = I{xet }λg(μ). If we now continue to use Eqs. (18) and (19)
until we reach the root of the tree, we eventually find that 20
ρg(μ) =
{
P({xE})λg(μ) if λg(μ) ≥ 0,
P({xE})λg(μ) if λg(μ) ≤ 0. (21)
Since we assumed from the outset that P(I{xE}) > 0, we gather from Eq. (12) that Rt(g|xE) = max{μ ∈ R : λg(μ) ≥ 0}.
Moreover, by combining Eqs. (14) and (16) with Proposition 4, we find that π c(xet ) = P↓c({xE∩↓c}|xet ) > 0 for all c ∈ S(st),
and therefore λg(μ) ≥ 0 ⇔ πμst (xet ) ≥ 0. Hence Rt(g|xE) = max{μ ∈ R : πμst (xet ) ≥ 0}.
We conclude that in order to update the tree in the situation described above, we can perform all calculations on the
sub-tree ↓st , where the new root st has local model Qst (·|xet ). This is also borne out by the discussion of the separation
properties in Section 5.
6.3. An algorithm
We now convert these observations into a workable algorithm.
Using regular extension and message passing, we are able to compute Rt(g|xE): we (i) choose any μ ∈ [min g,max g];
(ii) calculate the value of λg(μ) by sending messages from the terminal nodes towards the root; and (iii) repeat this in some
clever way to find the maximal μ that will make this λg(μ) zero. But we have seen above that this naive approach can
be sped up by exploiting (a) the separation properties of the tree and (b) the independence of μ (and g) for some of the
messages, namely those associated with nodes that do not precede the target node t.
For a start, aswe are only interested in the sign ofρg(μ) (or equivalently, that ofλg(μ)),whichwehave seen is determined
by the sign of π
μ
st (xet ), we only have to take into consideration the nodes that strictly follow et .
20 Actually, we easily derive that ρg(μ) = amax{λg(μ), 0} + bmin{λg(μ), 0}, where a and b are real constants that do not depend on g and μ. Letting
g := μ ± 1 then allows us to identify the constants a and b.
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Fig. 2. Calculation of Π4, which is a summary of the μ-independent messages in the trunk node 4.
Fig. 3. Calculation of π
μ
st (xet ), whose sign is the same as that of P(I{xE }[g − μ]).
The next thing a smarter implementation of the algorithm can do is determine the trunk T˜ of the tree: those nodes that
precede the queried node t and strictly follow the greatest observed node et preceding t. We can define the trunk more
formally as follows: T˜ := ↑t ∩↓C(et). For the tree in Fig. 1 for instance, where the darker X10 is the queried variable and the
lighter nodes {2, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 14, 15} are instantiated, the trunk is given by T˜ = {3, 4, 10} and indicated by bolder arrows.
We have a special interest in the nodes that constitute the trunk, because only they will send messages to their mother
nodes that actually depend on μ. As a consequence, all other nodes (all descendants of the trunk that are not in the trunk
themselves) sendmessages that have to be calculated only once. This implies that we can summarise all theμ-independent
messages by propagating all of them until they reach the trunk. Theμ-independent messages π s that arrive in a trunk node
s can be represented more succinctly by their point-wise products Π s := ∏c∈C(s)\T˜ π c , because Eqs. (18) and (19) only
depend on them through these products (see Fig. 2).
This means that for every trunk node s ∈ T˜ , we have to find the lower (upper) messages of every child c of s that is not
in the trunk itself. Both π c and π c can be calculated recursively using Eq. (16), where the recursion starts at the leaves and
moves up to (but stops right before) the trunk. In the leaves, the local lower and upper previsions of the indicator of the
evidence are sent upwards if the leaf is instantiated; if not the constant 1 is sent up, which is equivalent to deleting the node
from the tree. We could envisage removing barren nodes (all of whose descendants are uninstantiated, such as X1, X13, and
X16 in the example tree above) from the tree beforehand, but we believe that the computational overhead created by the
search for them will void the gain.
The only recursion that is still left to do is the calculation of the μ-dependent messages π
μ
s along the trunk. As demon-
strated in Fig. 3, we can calculate π
μ
st (et) using the following recursion formula:
πμs :=
{
Q
s
(max{g − μ, 0}Π s + min{g − μ, 0}Π s|Xm(s)) s = t,
Q
s
(max{πμct , 0}Π s + min{πμct , 0}Π s|Xm(s)) s ∈ T˜ \ {t} and C(s) ∩ T˜ = {ct}.
These formulas are reformulations of Eqs. (17)–(19), where the influence of the Π has been made explicit.
Since we now know how to calculateπ
μ
st (et), we can tackle the final problem: find themaximalμ for whichπ
μ
st (et) = 0.
In principle, a secant root-findingmethod could be used, but using the concavity and the non-increasing character ofπ
μ
st (et)
as a function of μ, we can speed up the calculation of the maximal root drastically as shown in Fig. 4.
Let us briefly discuss the complexity of our algorithm. Consider for a start that for a fixed μ each node makes a single
local computation and then propagates the result to its mother node: this implies that, withμ fixed, the algorithm is linear
in the number of nodes. Iterating onμ then amounts to multiplying such a linear complexity with the number of iterations.
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Fig. 4. The root of a concave and non-increasing function ρg whose values ρg(a) > ρg(b) > 0 > ρg(c) > ρg(d) are known, will always be in the interval [p,m]
withm := min{q,r}. Here p, q and r are the intersections with the horizontal axis of the straight lines through (b,ρg(b)) and (c,ρg(c)), (c,ρg(c)) and (d,ρg(d)),
and (a,ρg(a)) and (b,ρg(b)), respectively. The next function evaluation of ρg will be in t which bisects the error interval [p,m]. If ρg(t) > 0, then a becomes
b and b becomes t, otherwise d becomes c and c becomes t and a new interval [p,m] and matching t can be calculated. We stop iterating as soon as the error
interval [p,m] is smaller than a given tolerance tol, or ρg(t) is exactly zero.
This number depends on the function g, as the iterations are made to compute the root of a function that is known to
belong to the real interval [min g,max g]. If we assume that the bisection algorithm is employed to find the root—for the
sake of simplicity—and let r := max g − min g be the range of the function, then the number of iterations is bounded by
log2
r
tol
+ 1, where tol is some fixed tolerance. In other words, the number of iterations is linear in the number b of bits
needed to represent r in base 2. This means that the overall complexity of the algorithm is O(b·|T|), taking into account that
the computational complexity of our root-finding algorithm must be lower than for the bisection (and actually also for the
secant) algorithm. Since bwill be a small number21 in most cases (e.g. when the focus is on probabilities), we simply refer
to the complexity of our algorithm as linear in the number of nodes.
7. A simple example involving dilation
We present a very simple example that allows us to (i) follow the inference method discussed above in a step-by-step
fashion; (ii) see that there are separation properties for credal nets under strong independence that fail for credal trees under
epistemic irrelevance; and (iii) see that in that case we will typically observe dilation.
Consider the following imprecise Markov chain:
Tomake things as simple as possible, we suppose thatX1 = {a, b} and thatQ1 is a linear (or precise, or expectation-like)
model Q1 with mass function q. We also assume that Q2(·|X1) is a linear model Q2(·|X1) with conditional mass function
q(·|X1). We make no such restrictions on the local model Q3(·|X2). We also use the following simplifying notational device:
if we have three real numbers κ , κ and γ , we let
κ〈γ 〉 := κ max{γ, 0} + κ min{γ, 0}.
We observe X2 = x2 and X3 = x3, and want to make inferences about the target variable X1: for any g ∈ L (X1), we want
to know R1(g|x{2,3}). Letting r := R1({a}|x{2,3}) and r := R1({a}|x{2,3}), we infer from the separate coherence of R1(·|x{2,3})
that it suffices to calculate r and r, because
R1(g|x{2,3}) = g(b) + r〈g(a) − g(b)〉.
We let gμ = [I{a} − μ]I{x2}I{x3}, and apply the approach of the previous section. We see that the trunk T˜ = {1}, and the
instantiated leaf node 3 sends up the messages π3 = Q3({x3}|X2) to the instantiated node 2, which transforms them into
the messages
π2 = Q2({x2}|X1)π3(x2) =: q(x2|X1)q,
where we let q(x2|X1) := Q2({x2}|X1) and q := π3(x2). These messages are sent up to the (target) root node t = 1, which
transforms them into themessageπ
μ
1 = Q1(ψμ1 )withψμ1 = q(x2|X1)q〈I{a} −μ〉. If we also use that 0 ≤ μ ≤ 1, this leads
to
21 It could be argued that b should be bounded given the finiteness of a computer’s way to represent numbers.
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P1(g
μ) = πμ1 = q(a)q(x2|a)q[1 − μ] + q(b)q(x2|b)q[−μ],
so we find after applying regular extension that
r = R1({a}|x{2,3}) =
q(a)q(x2|a)q
q(a)q(x2|a)q + q(b)q(x2|b)q ,
r = R1({a}|x{2,3}) = q(a)q(x2|a)q
q(a)q(x2|a)q + q(b)q(x2|b)q .
When q = q, which happens for instance if the local model for X3 is precise, then we see that, with obvious notations,
r = r = q(a)q(x2|a)
q(a)q(x2|a) + q(b)q(x2|b) =: p(a|x2) (22)
and therefore X2 indeed separates X3 from X1. But in general, letting α := q(a)q(x2|a) and β := q(b)q(x2|b), we get
r − p(a|x2) = αβ
α + β
q − q
αq + βq and p(a|x2) − r =
αβ
α + β
q − q
αq + βq .
As soon as q > q, X2 no longer separates X3 from X1, and we witness dilation [12,13] because of the additional observation
of X3!
8. Numerical comparison with strong independence
Strong independence implies epistemic irrelevance, and hence inferred (lower–upper) probability intervals for imprecise
Markov trees with epistemic irrelevance will include those obtained assuming strong independence. This suggests that our
algorithm could also be used as a tool to make conservative (also called outer) approximations of the computations made
in a credal tree under strong independence. This could be an important application of our algorithm since at the moment
it is unclear whether or not updating probabilities in a tree is a polynomial task under strong independence. If it were not,
addressing the problem would definitely benefit from the availability of fast approximations.
With this idea in mind, we make a preliminary empirical exploration of the quality of the approximation. As noted
in Section 5, the two models have different separation properties: this is particularly important when evidence is back-
propagated from leaves to root. For this reason, we compare posterior probability intervals for the root variable of a chain
where only the leaf node is instantiated.
Fig. 5 reports the results of this comparison for chains with binary nodes, randomly generated local models, and variable
length (from 5 up to 100 nodes). The algorithm in Section 6 has been used to compute the posterior probability intervals
in the chains under epistemic irrelevance, while the 2U algorithm [18] was used for updating in the chains under strong
independence. The inferred probability intervals for the former turn out to be clearlywider, and themeandifference between
the two intervals is about 0.3 irrespective of the length of the chain, at least for chains with more than ten nodes.
For non-binary nodes there are no efficient algorithms known for updating chains with strong independence. We used
the procedure in [19] to update chains with less than seven ternary nodes and credal sets with three randomly generated
extreme points in the strong independence case. A similar difference between the posterior intervals was also observed in
these cases. For longer chains, updating for the chain under strong independence is too slow and no comparison can be
made. In summary, there is a non-negligible difference between the inferences based on the two notions of ‘independence’.
Thismeans that the epistemic approximations to the strong case could be quite crude in practice. However, their being outer
(that is, safe) approximations together with their light complexity could still make them very useful tools, whenever the
strong independence approach is deemed necessary or appropriate.
9. An application
The tree topology of the graphs considered in this paper is expressive enough to model useful and interesting problems.
These problems can then be solved efficiently by means of the algorithm described in the previous sections. We make this
point clearerwith an example application about character recognition. This is also an opportunity to illustrate the differences
between the traditional, precise-probability approach to the problem and the imprecise-probability one.Most notably, these
differences arise because the imprecise-probability methods come with the inherent ability to suspend judgement when
the information available is deemed insufficient to reliably recognise a character, whereas the precise-probability ones do
not.
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9.1. Imprecise hidden Markov models
HiddenMarkovmodels (HMMs) [20] arepopular tools formodelling a sequenceof hiddenvariables that generate a related
sequence of observable variables. These are respectively referred to as the generative and observable sequences. HMMs have
applications in many areas of signal processing, and more specifically in speech and text recognition.
Both the generative and the observable sequences are described by sets of variables over the same domain X, denoted
respectively by Xs1 , . . . , Xsn and Xo1 , . . . , Xon . The independence assumptions between these variables, which characterise
HMMs, are those corresponding to the tree structure below. Informally, this topology states that every element of the
generative sequence depends only on its predecessor, while each observation depends only on the corresponding element
of the generative sequence.
A local uncertainty model should be defined for each variable. In the case of precise probabilistic assessments, this cor-
responds to linear (precise, or expectation-like) versions of the local models Q
s1
, Q
sk+1(·|Xsk) and Qok(·|Xsk), k = 1, . . . , n,
where the conditional models are assumed to be stationary, i.e., independent of k. These model, respectively, beliefs about
the first state in the generative sequence, the transitions between adjacent states, and the observation process.
Bayesian techniques for learning frommultinomial data are usually employed for identifying thesemodels. But, especially
if only few data are available, other methods leading to imprecise assessments, such as the imprecise Dirichlet model (IDM,
[21]),might offer amore realisticmodel of the local uncertainty. For example, for the unconditional localmodelQ
s1
, applying
the IDM leads to the following simple identification:
Q
s1
({x1}) = n
s1
x1
s +∑x∈X ns1x , Qs1({x1}) =
s + ns1x1
s +∑x∈X ns1x , (23)
where ns1x1 counts the units in the sample for which Xs1 = x1 and s is a (positive real) hyper-parameter that expresses the
degree of caution in the inferences. For the conditional localmodels, we can proceed similarly. This leads to the identification
of an imprecise HMM, a special credal tree under epistemic irrelevance, like the ones introduced in Section 2.
Generally speaking, the algorithm described in Section 6 can be used for computing inferences with such imprecise
HMMs. Below, we address the more specific problem of on-line recognition, which consists in the identification of the most
likely value of Xsn , given the evidence for the whole observational sequence Xo1 = xo1 , . . . , Xon = xon . For precise local
models, this problem requires the computation of the state x˜sn := argmaxxsn∈X P({xsn}|xo1 , . . . , xon) that is most probable
after the observation. For imprecise local models different criteria can be adopted; see Ref. [22] for an overview.We consider
maximality: we order the states by xsn > zsn if and only if P(I{xsn }−I{zsn }|xo1 , . . . , xon) > 0, andwe look for the undominated
or maximal states under this order. This may produce indeterminate predictions: the set of undominated states may have
more than one element.
Fig. 5. Numerical evaluation of the difference between the sizes of the posterior intervals for inferences on credal chains over binary variables with epistemic
irrelevance and strong independence. The plot reports the mean difference (in ordinate) as a function of the number of nodes in the chains (in abscissa). Means
are estimated over 200 Monte Carlo runs.
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Table 1
Precise vs. imprecise HMMs. Test results obtained by twofold cross-validation on
the first two chants of Dante’s Divina Commedia and n = 2. Quantification is
achieved by IDM with s = 2 and Perks’ prior modified as suggested in [25, Sec-
tion 5.2]. The single-character output by the precise model is then guaranteed to
be included in the set of characters the imprecise HMM identifies.
Precise HMM
Accuracy 93.96% (7275/7743)
Accuracy (if imprecise indeterminate) 64.97% (243/374)
Imprecise HMM
Determinacy 95.17% (7369/7743)
Set-accuracy 93.58% (350/374)
Single accuracy 95.43% (7032/7369)
Indeterminate output size 2.97 out of 21 classes (1112/374)
9.2. On-line character recognition
As a very first application of the imprecise HMM, we have considered a character recognition problem.22 A written text
was regarded as a generative sequence,while the observable sequencewas obtained by artificially corrupting the text. This is
amodel for a not perfectly reliable observation process, such as the output of anOCR device. The localmodelswere identified
using the IDM, as in (23), by counting the occurrences of single characters and the ‘transitions’ from one character to another
in the generative sequence, and bymatchings between the elements of the two sequences. Bymodelling text as a generative
sequence, we obviously ignore any dependence that might be between a character and its nth predecessor, for any n ≥ 2.
A better, albeit still not completely realistic, model would resort to using n-grams (i.e., clusters of n characters with n ≥ 2)
instead of monograms. Such models might lead to higher accuracy, but they need larger data sets for their quantification,
because of the exponentially larger number of possible transitions for which probabilities have to be estimated. The figure
below depicts how on-line recognition through HMMmight apply to this setup.
The performance of the precise model can be characterised by its accuracy (the percentage of correct predictions) alone.
The imprecise HMM requires more indicators. We follow Corani and Zaffalon [24] in using the following:
determinacy percentage of determinate predictions,
set-accuracy percentage of indeterminate predictions containing the right state,
single accuracy percentage of correct predictions computed considering only determinate predictions, and
indeterminate output size average number of states returned when the prediction is indeterminate over a number of
possible states.
The recognition using our algorithm is fast: it never takes more than one second for each character. Table 1 reports
descriptive values for a large set (7743) of simulations and a comparison with precise model performance. Imprecise HMMs
guarantee quite accurate predictions. In contrast with the precise model, there are ‘indeterminate’ instances for which they
do not output a single state. Yet, this happens rarely, and even then we witness a remarkable reduction in the number
of undominated states (from the 21 letters of the Italian alphabet to less than 3). Interestingly, the instances for which
the imprecise probability model returns more than one state appear to be ‘difficult’ for the precise probability model: the
accuracy of the precise models displays a strong decrease if we focus only on these instances, while the imprecise models
here display basically the same performance as for other instances, by returning about three characters instead of a single
one.
10. Conclusions
We have defined imprecise-probability (or credal) trees using Walley’s notion of epistemic irrelevance. Credal trees
generalise tree-shaped Bayesian nets in two ways: by allowing the parameters of the tree to be imprecisely specified and
22 For a more involved application, related to aircraft trajectory model tracking, see Ref. [23].
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moreover by replacing the notion of stochastic independence with that of epistemic irrelevance. Our focusing on epistemic
irrelevance is the most original aspect of this work, as this notion has received limited attention so far in the context of
credal nets.
We have focused in particular on developing an efficient exact algorithm for updating beliefs on the tree. Like the
algorithms developed for precise graphical models, our algorithmworks in a distributed fashion by passing messages along
the tree. It computes lower and upper conditional previsions (expectations) with a complexity that is linear in the number
of nodes in the tree. This is remarkable because until now it was unclear whether an algorithm with the features described
abovewas at all feasible: in fact, epistemic irrelevance ismost easily formulated using coherent lower previsions, which have
never before been used as such in practical applications of credal nets. Moreover, it is at this point not clear that epistemic
irrelevance is as ‘well-behaved’ as strong independence iswith respect to the graphoid axioms for propagation of probability
in graphical models [26,27]. 23 Our results therefore appear very encouraging and seem to have the potential to open up
new avenues of research in credal nets.
On a more theoretical side, we have also shown that our credal trees satisfy the important rationality requirement of
coherence. This has been established under the assumption that the upper probability of any possible observation in the
tree is positive, which is a very mild requirement. The same assumption also allowed us to show that all inferences made by
updating the tree will be coherent with each other as well as with the local uncertainty models in the nodes of the tree.
On the applied side, we have presented an application of the credal tree model to the problem of character recognition,
where the parameters of the model are inferred from data. The empirical results are positive, especially because they show
that our credal trees are able to make more reliable predictions than their precise-probability counterparts.
Where to go from here? There are many possible avenues for future research.
It would be very useful to be able to extend the algorithm at least to the so-called polytrees, which are substantially
more expressive graphs than trees are. This could be a difficult task to achieve. In fact, updating credal nets based on
strong independence is an NP-hard task when the graph is more general than a tree [28]. Similar problems might affect the
algorithms for credal nets based on irrelevance.
For applications, it would be very important to develop statistical methods specialised for credal nets under irrelevance
that avoid introducing excessive imprecision in the process of inferring probabilities from data. This could be achieved, for
instance, by using a single global IDMover the variables of the tree rather thanmany local ones, aswe did in our experiments.
Another research direction could be concerned with trying to strengthen the conclusions that epistemic trees lead to.
Theremight be caseswhere ourMarkov condition based on epistemic irrelevance is tooweak as a structural assessment.We
havediscussed situationswhere this typeofMarkovcondition systematically leads toadilationofuncertaintywhenupdating
beliefs with observations and indicated that this dilation is related to (the lack of) certain separation properties induced
by epistemic irrelevance on a graph. Dilation might not be desirable in some applications, and we could be called upon to
strengthen the model in order to rule out such behaviour. One way to address the issue of dilation—but not necessarily the
easiest—could consist in adding additional irrelevance statements to the model, other than those derived from the Markov
condition. An easier avenue could be based on designing assumptions that together with theMarkov condition lead to some
stronger separation properties, while not necessarily requiring them to match the common ones used in Bayesian nets.
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Appendix. Proofs of important results
In this appendix, we justify formulas (16) and (20) and give proofs for Propositions 3 and 4, and Theorem 5.
Proof of Eqs. (16) and (20). Let us define the gambles
μs := P↓s(φμs |Xm(s)) ∈ L (Xm(s)), s  t
and, with obvious notations,
 s := P↓s(φμs |Xm(s)) ∈ L (Xm(s)), s  t.
23 Unlike credal nets based on strong independence, a credal net based on epistemic irrelevance cannot generally be seen as equivalent with a set of Bayesian
nets with the same graphical structure: if it were, then all separation properties of Bayesian nets would simply be inherited, and we have seen in Section 7 that
such is not the case.
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Let the chain ↑t be given by {t1, . . . , tr}, where t1 := , tr := t and tk := m(tk+1) for k = 1, . . . , r − 1. If we apply the
recursion equation (8) in s = t1 and take into account the separate coherence and the strong factorisation of the conditionally
independent natural extension P↓C(t1)(·|Xt1), we see that

μ
t1
= μ = ρg(μ) = P(φμt1) = Qt1(ψ
μ
t1
), (A.1)
where (provided that t1 = t and therefore r > 1)
ψ
μ
t1
:= P↓C(t1)(φμt1 |Xt1) = P↓C(t1)
(
g
μ
t1
∏
c∈C(t1)
φμc
∣∣∣Xt1
)
= gμt1P↓C(t1)
( ∏
c∈C(t1)
φμc
∣∣∣Xt1
)
= gμt1P↓C(t1)
(
P↓t2(φ
μ
t2
|Xt1)
∏
c∈C(t1)\{t2}
φμc
∣∣∣Xt1
)
= gμt1P↓C(t1)
(

μ
t2
∏
c∈C(t1)\{t2}
φμc
∣∣∣Xt1
)
=
[
max{μt2 , 0}P↓C(t1)
( ∏
c∈C(t1)\{t2}
φμc
∣∣∣Xt1
)
+ min{μt2 , 0}P↓C(t1)
( ∏
c∈C(t1)\{t2}
φμc
∣∣∣Xt1
)]
g
μ
t1
=
[
max{μt2 , 0}
∏
c∈C(t1)\{t2}
 c + min{μt2 , 0}
∏
c∈C(t1)\{t2}
 c
]
g
μ
t1
. (A.2)
Similarly, we find that

μ
t2
= P↓t2(φμt2 |Xt1) = Qt2(ψ
μ
t2
|Xt1), (A.3)
where (provided that t2 = t and therefore r > 2) in a completely similar way as above
ψ
μ
t2
:= P↓C(t2)(φμt2 |Xt2) =
[
max{μt3 , 0}
∏
c∈C(t2)\{t3}
 c + min{μt3 , 0}
∏
c∈C(t2)\{t3}
 c
]
g
μ
t2
. (A.4)
We can go on in this way until we come to tr = t:

μ
tr
= P↓tr (φμtr |Xtr−1) = Qtr (ψ
μ
tr
|Xtr−1), (A.5)
where, using the separate coherence and the strong factorisation of the conditionally independent natural extension
P↓C(tr)(·|Xtr ),
ψ
μ
t = ψμtr := P↓C(tr)(φμtr |Xtr ) = P↓C(tr)
(
g
μ
tr
∏
c∈C(tr)
φμc
∣∣∣Xtr
)
= P↓C(tr)
(
[g − μ]∏
c∈C(tr)
φμc
∣∣∣Xtr
)
= max{g − μ, 0}P↓C(tr)
( ∏
c∈C(tr)
φμc
∣∣∣Xtr
)
+ min{g − μ, 0}P↓C(tr)
( ∏
c∈C(tr)
φμc
∣∣∣Xtr
)
= max{g − μ, 0}∏
c∈C(t)
 c + min{g − μ, 0}
∏
c∈C(t)
 c. (A.6)
Clearly, if we can prove that  s = π s for all s  t, it will follow from the considerations above that also μs = πμs for all
s  t, and then the proof is complete. This is what we now set out to do. Consider any s  t. Then applying the recursion
equation (8) and taking into account the separate coherence and the strong factorisation of the conditionally independent
natural extension P↓C(s)(·|Xs), we see that, provided s is not a terminal node, and with obvious notations,
 s = P↓s(φμs |Xm(s)) = Qs(ψ s|Xm(s)), (A.7)
where
ψ
s
:= P↓C(s)(φμs |Xs) = P↓C(s)
(
gμs
∏
c∈C(s)
φμc
∣∣∣Xs
)
= gμs P↓C(s)
( ∏
c∈C(s)
φμc
∣∣∣Xs
)
= gμs
∏
c∈C(s)
P↓c(φμc |Xs) = gμs
∏
c∈C(s)
 c. (A.8)
Gert de Cooman et al. / International Journal of Approximate Reasoning 51 (2010) 1029–1052 1049
If on the other hand s is a terminal node, then we can use Eq. (9) to find that
 s = P↓s(φμs |Xm(s)) = Qs(φμs |Xm(s)) = Qs(gμs |Xm(s)) = π s, (A.9)
where the last equality follows from Eq. (15). Now combine Eqs. (A.7)–(A.9) and use recursion to complete the proof. 
Proof of Proposition 3. Fix any xT in XT . We need to prove that P({xT }) > 0 and that P↓S({x↓S}|zs) > 0 for all s ∈ T♦,
non-empty S ⊆ C(s) and zs ∈ Xs. Our argumentation is similar to a special case of the one in Section 6.2. We use the
notation established there, but with in particular g := μ + 1, t :=  and E := T . This implies that gμ = I{xT }, gμs = I{xs}
and φ
μ
s = I{x↓s}. In accordance with Eq. (15), we define the messages π s ∈ L (Xm(s)) and λs ∈ L (Xs) recursively by:
λs :=
∏
c∈C(s)
π c and π s := Qs(I{xs}λs|Xm(s)),= λs(xs)Qs({xs}|Xm(s)), s ∈ T (A.10)
with, as before by convention λs := 1 in all leaves s. The last equality follows from the separate coherence of the local
models Qs(·|Xm(s)) and the fact that all messages π s and λs are non-negative. It is clear from the recursion equations (7)
and (8) (see also Eq. (16), the proof is completely similar to that of Eqs. (16) and (20) given above) that P↓s({x↓s}|Xm(s)) = π s,
for all s ∈ T , and that P↓C(s)({x↓C(s)}|Xs) = λs for all s ∈ T♦. Similarly, it follows from Eq. (11), conjugacy and the strong
factorisation property of the conditionally independent natural extension that P↓S({x↓S}|Xs) = ∏c∈S π c for all s ∈ T♦ and
all non-empty S ⊆ C(s). So we have to prove that all values (all components) of all messages π s, s ∈ T are (strictly) positive.
This follows at once from the recursion equation (A.10) and the assumed strict positivity of the local models Qs(·|Xm(s)). 
Proof of Proposition 4. Our argumentation is similar to a special case of the one in Section 6.2.We also use notation similar
to that established there, with in particular g := μ + 1 and t := . In accordance with Eq. (15), we define the messages
π s ∈ L (Xm(s)) and λs ∈ L (Xs) recursively by:
λs :=
∏
c∈C(s)
π c, s ∈ T (A.11)
and
π s :=
{
λs(xs)Qs({xs}|Xm(s)) if s ∈ E
Qs(λs|Xm(s)) if s ∈ T \ E. (A.12)
with, as before by convention λs := 1 in all leaves s. All these messages are non-negative by construction. It is clear from
the recursion equations (7) and (8) (see also Eq. (16), the proof is completely similar to that of Eqs. (16) and (20) given
above) that P↓s({xE∩↓s}|Xm(s)) = π s for all s ∈ T . Now it follows from the recursion equations (A.11) and (A.12) and the
assumption P({xE}) = π > 0 that λe(xe) > 0 for all e ∈ E. Again applying Eq. (A.11), we find that indeed π c(xe) > 0 for
all c ∈ C(e). 
Our proof of Theorem 5 relies heavily on a very convenient coherence result proved by Miranda [9, Theorem 6], which
we relate here to make the paper more self-contained. We use the notations established in the context of Section 3.
Theorem 6. Let P be a (separately) coherent lower prevision onL (XN), and consider m disjoint pairs of subsets Ok and Ik of N,
k = 1, . . . ,m. Assume that P({xIk}) > 0 for all xIk ∈ XIk , k = 1, . . . ,m and use regular extension to define the conditional
lower previsions R(·|XIk) on L (XOk), for k = 1, . . . ,m. Then the (conditional) lower previsions P, R(·|XI1), . . . , R(·|XIm) are
(jointly) coherent.
Proof of Theorem 5. We begin by showing that the family of models T (P) satisfies requirements T1–T3.
To prove T1, consider any s ∈ T , and any f ∈ L (Xs), then it follows from separate coherence that P↓C(s)(f |Xs) = f , and
therefore we infer from the recursion equation (8) that indeed P↓s(f |Xm(s)) = Qs(P↓C(s)(f |Xs)|Xm(s)) = Qs(f |Xm(s)).
Next, we turn to the proof of T2 and T3. Consider any s ∈ T♦, S ⊆ C(s) and R ⊆ S. Let x{s}∪R ∈ X{s}∪R and f ∈
L (X↓S∪{s}∪R). We calculate the following regular extension of the joint:
R(f |x{s}∪R) = max{μ ∈ R : P(I{x{s}∪R}[f − μ]) ≥ 0}. (A.13)
Consider that
I{x{s}∪R}[f − μ] = I{xs}I{xR}[g − μ],
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where g := f (·, xs, xR) ∈ L (X↓S). Let t2 be the unique child of t1 :=  such that s ∈ ↓t2 (assuming of course that
s = t1 = ). By using separate coherence, recursion equations (7), (8) and (10), and the strong factorisation property (see
Proposition 1) of the conditionally independent natural extension, in a way similar to the argumentation in Section 6.2, we
see that
P(I{x{s}∪R}[f − μ]) = Qt1(P↓C(t1)(I{xR\↓t2 }P↓C(t1)(I{xs}I{xR∩↓t2 }[g − μ]|Xt1)|Xt1))
= Q
t1
(P↓C(t1)(h2P↓t2(I{xs}I{xR∩↓t2 }[g − μ]|Xt1)|Xt1))
= P↓t1(h2P↓t2(I{xs}I{xR∩↓t2 }[g − μ]|Xt1)),
where h2 := I{xR\↓t2 } ≥ 0. Similarly, let t3 be the unique child of t2 such that s ∈ ↓t3 (assuming of course that s = t2). Then
we see in the same way as above that
P↓t2(I{xs}I{xR∩↓t2 }[g − μ]|Xt1) = P↓t2(h3P↓t3(I{xs}I{xR∩↓t3 }[g − μ]|Xt2)|Xt1),
where h3 := I{xR\↓t3 } ≥ 0. Continuing in this way, we eventually come to the conclusion that
P(I{x{s}∪R}[f − μ]) = G(P↓C(s)(hI{xs}[g − μ]|Xs)), (A.14)
where h := I{xR∩↓C(s)} = I{xR∩(↓C(s)\↓S)}, and where the real functional G onL (Xs) is essentially constructed as follows. Con-
sider the segment t1t2 · · · tr−1tr connecting and s, i.e., tr := s, tr−1 := m(tr), . . . , tk := m(tk+1), . . . , t1 := m(t2) = .
Then there are non-negative hk onX↓tk such that for all f ∈ L (Xs),G(f ) = f1, where fr := f and fk := P↓tk+1(hk+1fk+1|Xtk),
k = 1, . . . , r−1. (If r = 1, or in otherwords s = t1 = , just letG := P↓.) In otherwords, the functionalG results from re-
cursivelymultiplyingwith non-negativemaps and applying global conditional lower previsions. As such,G is non-negatively
homogeneous and super-additive (because the successivemultiplication and composition preserve these properties). In ad-
dition, it does not depend on g norμ. If we use the separate coherence of P↓C(s)(·|Xs), the strong factorisation, associativity
and marginalisation properties of the conditionally independent natural extension P↓C(s)(·|Xs) (see Proposition 1, Eqs. (4)
and (5), and the recursion equations (7) and (10)), and the separate coherence of the conditional lower prevision P↓S(·|xs),
we get:
P↓C(s)(hI{xs}[g − μ]|Xs) = I{xs}P↓C(s)(h[g − μ]|xs)
= I{xs}
{
P↓C(s)(h|xs)[P↓S(g|xs) − μ] if P↓S(g|xs) ≥ μ,
P↓C(s)(h|xs)[P↓S(g|xs) − μ] if P↓S(g|xs) ≤ μ. (A.15)
Combining Eqs. (A.14) and (A.15), and invoking the non-negative homogeneity of the real functional G, this leads to:
P(I{x{s}∪R}[f − μ]) =
{
G(I{xs})P↓C(s)(h|xs)[P↓S(g|xs) − μ] if P↓S(g|xs) ≥ μ,
G(I{xs})P↓C(s)(h|xs)[P↓S(g|xs) − μ] if P↓S(g|xs) ≤ μ,
where we let G(I{xs}) := −G(−I{xs}). By letting f = μ ± 1 [and therefore also g = μ ± 1] in this expression, we derive in
particular that
P({x{s}∪R}) = G(I{xs})P↓C(s)(h|xs) and P({x{s}∪R}) = G(I{xs})P↓C(s)(h|xs),
and therefore also
P(I{x{s}∪R}[f − μ]) =
{
P({x{s}∪R})[P↓S(g|xs) − μ] if P↓S(g|xs) ≥ μ,
P({x{s}∪R})[P↓S(g|xs) − μ] if P↓S(g|xs) ≤ μ.
Sincewe have assumed that all localmodelsQs(·|Xm(s)) are strictly positive, we gather from Proposition 3 that P({x{s}∪R}) >
0, and therefore
P(I{x{s}∪R}[f − μ]) ≥ 0 ⇔ P↓S(g|xs) ≥ μ.
This allows us to infer from Eq. (A.13) that
R(f |x{s}∪R) = P↓S(f (·, xs, xR)|xs) for all f ∈ L (X↓S∪{s}∪R) and x{s}∪R ∈ X{s}∪R. (A.16)
If we now combine Eq. (A.16) with Theorem 6, we see that both T2 and T3 hold.
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To complete the proof, we consider T4. Consider any family of models T (V) that satisfies conditions T1–T3. Then we
want to show that
V↓S(·|Xt) ≥ P↓S(·|Xt) for all t ∈ T♦ and all non-empty S ⊆ C(s) (A.17)
and
V ≥ P . (A.18)
The proof proceeds in a recursive (inductive) fashion. Since the V↓t(·|Xm(t)) satisfy T1, we infer in particular that
V↓t(·|Xm(t)) = P↓t(·|Xm(t)) = Qt(·|Xm(t)) for all terminal nodes t.
It is therefore clearly sufficient to prove the following statement for all non-terminal nodes t ∈ T♦:
(∀c ∈ C(t)) (V↓c(·|Xt) ≥ P↓c(·|Xt)) ⇒
{
V↓S(·|Xt) ≥ P↓S(·|Xt) for all non-empty S ⊆ C(t),
V↓t(·|Xm(t)) ≥ P↓t(·|Xm(t)). (A.19)
This is what we now set out to do. Fix any non-terminal node t ∈ T♦ and any non-empty S ⊆ C(t), and assume that
V↓c(·|Xt) ≥ P↓c(·|Xt) for all c ∈ C(t).
First of all, define for any disjoint proper subsets I and O of S, the conditional lower previsions V↓O(·|X{t}∪↓I) through:
V↓O(f |x{t}∪↓I) = V↓O(f (·, x↓I)|xt) for all f ∈ L (X↓O∪↓I) and all x{t}∪↓I ∈ X{t}∪↓I.
Then we infer from T3 (with S = O, s = t and R = ↓I ⊆ O) that all these conditional lower previsions are in particular
(jointly) coherent with the conditional lower prevision V↓S(·|Xt). If we recall Definition 3 (with N = {↓c : c ∈ S} and
Y = Xt), we conclude that V↓C(t)(·|Xt) is a conditionally independent product of the ‘marginals’ V↓c(·|Xt), c ∈ S, which
therefore dominates the smallest such independent product:
V↓S(·|Xt) ≥ ⊗c∈SV↓c(·|Xt)
and therefore, using the assumption, we infer from this inequality that
V↓S(·|Xt) ≥ ⊗c∈SV↓c(·|Xt) ≥ ⊗c∈SP↓c(·|Xt) = P↓S(·|Xt), (A.20)
where we have also used, successively, the monotonicity property of the conditionally independent natural extension (see
Ref. [14] for a proof) and the recursion equations (7) and (11).
Next, define the conditional lower prevision V↓C(t)(·|X{m(t),t}) onL (X{m(t)}∪↓t) through:
V↓C(t)(f |x{m(t),t}) := V↓C(t)(f (xm(t), xt, ·)|xt) for all f ∈ L (X{m(t)}∪↓t) and all x{m(t),t} ∈ X{m(t),t}. (A.21)
Thenwe infer from T3 (with s = t, S = C(t) and R = {m(t)} ⊆ C(t)) that this conditional lower prevision V↓C(t)(·|X{m(t),t})
is in particular (jointly) coherent with the conditional lower prevision V↓t(·|Xm(t)) defined onL (X{m(t)}∪↓t). We then see
that for all g ∈ L (X↓t):
V↓t(g|Xm(t)) ≥ V↓t(V↓C(t)(g|X{m(t),t})|Xm(t))
= V↓t(V↓C(t)(g|Xt)|Xm(t)) = Qt(V↓C(t)(g|Xt)|Xm(t))
≥ Q
t
(P↓C(t)(g|Xt)|Xm(t))
= P↓t(·|Xm(t)).
The first equality follows from Eq. (A.21), the second one holds because the global models V↓t(·|Xm(t)) satisfy T1, and the
third one follows fromrecursion equation (8). Thefirst inequality follows ifweapplyWalley’sMarginal ExtensionTheorem24
[4, Theorem 6.7.2] in the formulation of [7, Theorem 4]. The second inequality follows from the inequality (A.20) and the
non-decreasing character of Q
t
(·|Xm(t)), which follows from separate coherence. This completes our proof that T4 is also
satisfied.
The last part of the proof follows at once from Eqs. (A.16) (with R = ∅), and Theorem 6. 
24 Recall that this is a coherence result that generalises the so-called Law of Iterated Expectations to coherent lower previsions.
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